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A Coverage Theory of Bistatic Radar Networks:
Worst-Case Intrusion Path and Optimal Deployment
ABSTRACT
Continuing advances in radar technology are driven both
by new application regimes and technological innovations.
A family of applications of increasing importance is detec-
tion of a mobile target intruding into a protected area, and
one type of radar system architecture potentially well suited
to this type of application entails a network of cooperating
radars. In this paper, we study optimal radar deployment for
intrusion detection, with focus on network coverage. In con-
trast to the disk-based sensing model in a traditional sensor
network, the detection range of a bistatic radar depends
on the locations of both the radar transmitter and radar
receiver, and is characterized by Cassini ovals. Further-
more, in a network with multiple radar transmitters and re-
ceivers, since any pair of transmitter and receiver can po-
tentially form a bistatic radar, the detection ranges of dif-
ferent bistatic radars are coupled and the corresponding
network coverage is intimately related to the locations
of all transmitters and receivers, making the optimal de-
ployment design highly non-trivial. Clearly, the detectabil-
ity of an intruder depends on the highest SNR received by
all possible bistatic radars. We focus on the worst-case in-
trusion detectability, i.e., the minimum possible detectabil-
ity along all possible intrusion paths. Although it is plau-
sible to deploy radars on a shortest line segment across the
field, it is not always optimal in general, which we illustrate
via counter-examples. We then present a sufficient condition
on the field geometry for the optimality of shortest line de-
ployment to hold. Further, we quantify the local structure
of detectability corresponding to a given deployment order
and spacings of radar transmitters and receivers, building on
which we characterize the optimal deployment to maximize
the worst-case intrusion detectability. Our results show that
the optimal deployment locations exhibit a balanced struc-
ture. We also develop a polynomial-time approximation al-
gorithm for characterizing the worse-case intrusion path for
any given locations of radars under random deployment.
Keywords
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Figure 1: Bistatic radar SNR contours as Cassini
ovals with foci at radar transmitter T and radar
receiver R for distance products: c1 < c2 < c3 <
c4.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
An active radar system consists of a collection of
transmitters and receivers in which transmitters emit
RF signals and the receivers capture signals resulting
from scattering of the transmitted signals reflected by
objects of interest (targets). A monostatic radar is one
in which a single transmitter and single receiver are col-
located. A bistatic radar is also comprised of a single
transmit-receive pair, but the transmitter and receiver
are at different locations. Multistatic radar refers to a
configuration that consists of multiple receivers at dif-
ferent locations. Although physical-layer issues in radar
have been extensively studied [1], very limited atten-
tion has been paid to radar network design [2–4]. No-
tably, [2] considered a network of monostatic radars,
and [3, 4] studied a multistatic radar with one trans-
mitter. We are thus motivated to consider a network of
multiple radar transmitters and receivers where any pair
of transmitter and receiver can form a bistatic radar.
Unlike traditional passive sensors, one salient feature
of radar sensing is that it actively emits signals to illu-
minate the target. Further, radar technology provides
superior penetration capability by using radio waves.
Worth mentioning is that the cost of radars can be much
higher than traditional sensors.
The problem of detecting intrusion into a protected
area, across a border or security perimeter, is of increas-
ing interest for numerous applications, and has great po-
tential in several regimes of growing importance, such
as border monitoring, industrial and airport security,
and drug interdiction. Worst-case coverage [5] is a com-
mon criterion of efficacy in intrusion detection that has
been applied extensively in the context of sensor net-
works [6–9]. It is intimately related to the minimum
possible detectability of an intruder (target) travers-
ing a monitored field. In a bistatic radar network, the
worst-case coverage is quite different and more diffi-
cult to quantify than traditional sensor networks, be-
cause 1) departing from the disk-based sensing range
of a traditional sensor, the detection range of a bistatic
radar depends on the locations of both radar transmit-
ter and receiver and is characterized by the Cassini oval
(in scenarios where intruder detectability is dominated
by SNR). Formally, a Cassini oval is a locus of points
for which the distances to two fixed points (foci) have
a constant product (as illustrated in Figure 1); 2) the
sensing ranges of different bistatic radars are coupled
with each other, since each transmitter (or receiver) can
pair with other receivers (or transmitters) to form mul-
tiple bistatic radars, indicating that its location would
impact multiple bistatic radars.
1.2 Summary of Main Contributions
• We first rigorously quantify the intrusion detectabil-
ity and network coverage attainable by a bistatic
radar network, while taking into account the com-
plication that each pair of transmitter and receiver
can potentially form a bistatic radar. We then
study the worst-case coverage under determinis-
tic deployment, aiming to find optimal deployment
locations of radar transmitters and receivers such
that the worst-case intrusion detectability is max-
imized. We present a sufficient condition on the
field geometry under which it is optimal to de-
ploy radars on a shortest line segment across the
field, which we refer as a shortcut barrier. The
line barrier appears intuitive but does not hold for
arbitrary field geometry, for which we give counter-
examples. Further, when radars are deployed on
the shortcut barrier, the worst-case intrusion de-
tectability turns out to be the vulnerability of the
shortcut barrier, which is the minimum detectabil-
ity of all points on it.
• Amain thrust of this study is devoted to character-
izing the optimal deployment locations of radars
on the shortcut barrier to minimize its vulnera-
bility. Since the optimization problem is neither
differentiable nor convex, it is highly non-trivial
to solve. We first quantify the local structure of
detectability corresponding to a given deployment
order and spacings along a shortcut barrier. Then,
for a given deployment order, we establish the exis-
tence and optimality of balanced deployment spac-
ings required to attain the minimum vulnerability.
Next, we derive sufficient conditions for an opti-
mal deployment order, and characterize the cor-
responding optimal deployment orders. Our find-
ings reveal that the optimal deployment locations
exhibit a balanced structure. Furthermore, under
the optimal deployment, it suffices for a receiver
to form at most two bistatic radars to guarantee
the optimal coverage quality, under the condition
that the number of receivers is no less than that
of transmitters (which is often the case since radar
transmitters are more costly).
• We also study the worst-case coverage under ran-
dom deployment, and quantify the worst-case in-
trusion path for any given deployment of radars.
In particular, by developing a novel 2-site Voronoi
diagram with graph search techniques, we design
an algorithm to find an approximate worst-case in-
trusion detectability, where the approximation er-
ror can be made arbitrarily small. The algorithm
is shown to have polynomial-time complexity.
We believe that the studies we initiated here on bistatic
radar networks scratch only the tip of the iceberg. There
are still many questions remaining open for the design
of a networked radar system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the model of worst-case coverage for
the bistatic radar network. In Section 3, we charac-
terize the optimal deployment of radars for maximizing
the worst-case detectability. Section 4 presents an ef-
ficient algorithm for finding an approximate worst-case
detectability given arbitrary locations of radars. Sec-
tion 5 provides the evaluation results. Related works
are discussed in Section 6. The paper is concluded in
Section 7.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
Basic Setting. We consider a bistatic radar network
deployed in a field of interest F . The field F is a
bounded and connected region enclosed by four curves:
a left boundary Fl, a right boundary Fr , an entrance
side, and a destination side (see Figure 2). Note that
we allow the boundary curves of the field to be ar-
bitrary. An intruder (target) can traverse through F
along any intrusion path P ⊂ F from a point on the
entrance to a point on the destination. Specifically, the
bistatic radar network consists of M radar transmitters
Ti ∈ T , i ∈ M , {1, · · · ,M} and N radar receivers
Rj ∈ R, j ∈ N , {1, · · · , N}. We assume that each
pair of transmitter and receiver can potentially form
a bistatic radar. We further assume that orthogonal
transmissions are used for interference avoidance. For
convenience, we also use Ti or Rj to denote the location
(point) of node Ti or Rj , respectively.
Bistatic radar SNR and Cassini Oval. For a bistatic
radar, the received SNR for a target is given by
SNR =
K
‖TX‖2‖RX‖2 (1)
where ‖TX‖ and ‖RX‖ denote the transmitter-target
and receiver-target distances, respectively, and K de-
note bistatic radar constant which reflects physical-layer
system characteristics, such as transmitting power, radar
cross section, and transmitter/receiver antenna power
gains. For ease of exposition, we assume the bistatic
radar constant is the same, and our study on homoge-
neous bistatic radars here will serve as a major step for
studying the heterogenous case. Given a bistatic radar,
the SNR contours are characterized by the Cassini ovals
with foci at the transmitter and receiver. We use CT,R(c)
to denote the Cassini oval with foci at points T and R
for constant distance product c.
Intrusion Detectability and Network Coverage. Let
‖ab‖ denote the (Euclidean) distance between two points
a and b. It follows from (1) that the received SNR by
a bistatic radar {Ti, Rj} from a target at some point
p is determined by the distance product ‖Tip‖‖Rjp‖.
Then the detectability of a point p is quantified by the
minimum distance product from p to all bistatic radars,
denoted by
I(p) , min
Ti∈T ,Rj∈R
‖Tip‖‖Rjp‖. (2)
Observe from (2) that the detectability increases when
I(p) reduces, and vice versa. The detectability of an
intruder is captured by the detectability of its intrusion
path P , which is the maximum detectability of all points
on P , denoted by
B(P ) , min
p∈P
I(p). (3)
From the radar network’s perspective, in the worst case,
the intruder traverses through F along an intrusion path
P ∗ such that B(P ∗) is maximized. We refer this path
and its detectability as the worst-case intrusion path
and the worst-case intrusion detectability (WID), re-
spectively.
3. DETERMINISTIC DEPLOYMENT
We consider both deterministic deployment and ran-
dom deployment scenarios, in the same spirit as the
arbitrary/random network models in the seminal work
by Gupta and Kumar [10]. In the deterministic de-
ployment case, our goal is to find optimal deployment
locations of radar nodes (i.e., M transmitters and N
receivers) in F such that WID is maximized, i.e.,
minimize
Ti∈F,Rj∈F
B(P ∗) (4)
H
Fl Fr
destination
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P
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Figure 2: (a) H is a shortcut barrier; (b) H is a
shortest barrier but not a shortcut barrier since
H ′ is shorter than H; the optimal deployment
may not be on H.
The above problem is highly non-trivial in general since
the boundaries of field F can be arbitrary. In particular,
we are interested in the line-based deployment scheme in
which radars are deployed along a line which is simple
to implement in practice. Further, we will show that
it is optimal under some mild condition on the field
geometry. To the best of our knowledge, the optimality
of line-based deployment for worst-case coverage has not
been studied in literature.
3.1 Shortcut Barrier-based Deployment
We need the notion of barrier to establish our re-
sults on the line-based deployment. Given any c > 0,
the detection range of a bistatic radar {Ti, Rj}, de-
noted by ATi,Rj (c), is the region enclosed by the Cassini
oval CTi,Rj (c) such that ‖Tip‖‖Rjp‖ ≤ c for all p ∈
ATi,Rj (c). The detection range of the bistatic radar
network, denoted by A(c), is the union of the detection
ranges of all the bistatic radars. A barrier is a curve in
the field F connecting the left boundary Fl and right
boundary Fr such that any intrusion path through F
intersects with the barrier. The worst-case coverage is
intimately related to the notion of barrier as given in
the next property. The proof is based on an argument
similar to the growing disks in [7] and is omitted here.
Property 1. The worst-case intrusion detectability
B(P ∗) is equal to the smallest value of c such that there
exists a barrier in the network’s detection range A(c).
We define the vulnerability of a barrier U as the mini-
mum detectability of all points in U , denoted by
Q(U) , max
p∈U
I(p). (5)
Intuitively, we expect to attain the best coverage qual-
ity by deploying radars along a shortest barrier which
an intruder must pass through. We make the following
assumption on the geometry of field F .
Assumption 1. There exists a shortest line segment
H connecting Fl and Fr such that H ⊂ F .
Although a shortest line segment connecting Fl and Fr
always exists, it is critical to assume that it lies in the
field F (see Figure 2). We refer such an H as the short-
cut barrier (SCB) and let h denote its length. In other
words, h is the shortest distance between a point in Fl
and a point in Fr. Note that a shortcut barrier is always
a shortest barrier that has the shortest length among all
barriers, but the converse is not true (as illustrated in
Figure 2). Assumption 1 captures a large class of field
geometry, e.g., any F of convex shape belongs to this
class.
The next result shows that the SCB-based deploy-
ment is indeed optimal if the shortcut barrier exists.
(All proofs of the theorems and lemmas in the sequel
are relegated to Appendix).
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, it is optimal to
deploy radars on the shortcut barrier H, in order to
maximize the worse-case intrusion detectability.
Although Theorem 1 appears intuitive, we caution
that it is non-trivial since the proof hinges on the exis-
tence of a shortcut barrier such that a line barrier with
no greater vulnerability can be constructed from any
arbitrary barrier. In other words, if the shortcut bar-
rier does not exist, the optimal deployment may not be
on a shortest barrier (see Figure 2(b)).
Let Hl and Hr denote the end points of H with
Hl ∈ Fl and Hr ∈ Fr. Note that the worst-case in-
trusion detectability under a line-based deployment is
no greater than, but not necessarily equal to, the vul-
nerability of the line segment. However, the equality
holds for the SCB-based deployment as we show in the
next result.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, if radars are de-
ployed on the shortcut barrier H, the worst-case intru-
sion detectability amounts to the vulnerability of H, i.e.,
B(P ∗) = Q(H).
Combining Theorem 1 and 2, we conclude that the
problem (4) is equivalent to finding the radar deploy-
ment on the shortcut barrier H such that Q(H) is min-
imized.
3.2 Line-based Optimal Deployment Locations
In this subsection, we study the optimal deployment
locations of radars on the shortcut barrier H to mini-
mize Q(H). Let ti , ‖HlTi‖ and rj , ‖HlRj‖. Mathe-
matically, our problem can be formulated as
minimize
ti,rj
max
0≤x≤h
min
i∈M,j∈N
|x− ti||x− rj | (6)
subject to 0 ≤ ti ≤ h, i ∈M
0 ≤ rj ≤ h, j ∈ N
where mini∈M,j∈N |x − ti||x − rj | represents the de-
tectability of a point p ∈ H with ‖Hlp‖ = x. It can
be easily checked that the objective function of prob-
lem (6) is neither differentiable nor convex in general.
Therefore, standard optimization methods can not be
applied here.
Consider the reformulation of problem (6) as follows.
First, we treat Hl and Hr as two virtual nodes and
relax the constraint HlHr = h. Suppose all nodes in
T and R as well as Hl and Hr are deployed on a line
such that Hl and Hr are the leftmost and rightmost
nodes, respectively. Let S , (Hl, S1, · · · , SJ , Hr) de-
note a deployment order (“order” for short) of all nodes,
where J , M + N and (S1, · · · , SJ) is a permutation
of the set T ∪ R such that ‖HlHl‖ = 0 ≤ ‖HlS1‖ ≤
· · · ≤ ‖HlSJ‖ ≤ ‖HlHr‖. Without ambiguity, S also
denote an order of locations of all nodes. Let DS =
(‖HlS1‖, · · · , ‖SJHr‖) denote the deployment spacings
(“spacings” for short) of a given deployment order of
nodes S, which are the distances between all pairs of
neighbor nodes in S. Similarly, let (Si, Si+1, · · · , Si+j)
denote a deployment suborder (“suborder” for short),
which is a deployment order of neighbor nodes in S,
and D(Si,Si+1··· ,Si+j) = (‖SiSi+1‖, · · · , ‖Si+j−1Si+j‖)
denote its deployment spacings. Clearly, any deploy-
ment order S with any deployment spacings DS repre-
sent some deployment locations of T and R on a line
segment with length ‖HlHr‖. Likewise, any deployment
locations of T andR on the line barrierH can be repre-
sented by some deployment order S with some deploy-
ment spacings DS under the constraint ‖HlHr‖ = h.
To summarize, the problem (6) can be recast as
Problem 1. Find an optimal deployment order S∗
with optimal deployment spacings D∗
S∗
under the con-
straint ‖HlHr‖ = h such that Q(HlHr) is minimized.
In what follows, we outline the main steps to solve
Problem 1.
Step1: We show a general and important structure of de-
tectability on HlHr (Lemma 1), which leads to the
concept of balanced spacings.
Step2: We introduce the concept of local suborder. Then
we show the existence and characterize balanced
spacings for a local suborder (Lemma 2), and es-
tablish the optimality of balanced spacings for a
local suborder (Lemma 3).
Step3: We rule out some orders from consideration, which
leads to the concept of candidate order (Lemma 4).
Then we show that a candidate order consists of
decoupled local suborders, such that the results in
Step 2 can be applied to show that balanced spac-
ings exist and are optimal for a candidate order
(Theorem 3).
Step4: Based on the optimal spacings obtained above, we
derive sufficient conditions for an optimal order
(Theorem 4). Then we characterize the optimal
orders.
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local vulnerable value
Figure 3: The detectability of a point attains
local minimums at the end points and the mid-
points of all pairs of neighbor radar nodes. The
local vulnerable values are (a) unequal with ar-
bitrary deployment spacings; and (b) equal with
balanced deployment spacings.
We start with two observations. First, swapping the
locations of any pair of transmitters or any pair of re-
ceivers results in an equivalent deployment. Second,
transmitters and receivers are reciprocal to each other.
Specifically, replacing all transmitters by receivers and
replacing all receivers by transmitters results in an equiv-
alent deployment. These observations will be used re-
peatedly in the sequel.
Let Yab denote the midpoint between two points a
and b. In the next lemma, we show a local structure for
the vulnerability of HlHr.
Lemma 1. Given any order S with any spacings DS,
I(p) attains local maximums on HlHr at the end nodes
Hl and Hr, and at the midpoints of all pairs of neigh-
bor nodes in (S1, · · · , SJ ) (as depicted in Figure 3). In
particular,
arg max
p∈HlS1
I(p) = Hl, arg max
p∈SJHr
I(p) = Hr
arg max
p∈SiSi+1
I(p) = YSiSi+1 , ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , J − 1}.
For convenience, we refer a local maximum point of I(p)
and its value as a local vulnerable point and local vulner-
able value, respectively. The local structure presented
in Lemma 1 is essentially due to that the detectability
of a point is dominated by the closet transmitter and
receiver. Therefore, it suffices to characterize the local
vulnerable values at the local vulnerable points to de-
termine the vulnerability of HlHr. We say the spacings
of an order of nodes are balanced if all the local vul-
nerable values between or on the two end nodes of that
order are equal (see Figure 3).
We define the pattern of an order of nodes as the or-
der of node types (transmitter type T or receiver type
R) of those nodes. We use T k or Rk to denote k consec-
utive T or R in a pattern, respectively. We define three
kinds of local patterns P1 = (T,R
k, Hr), (R, T
k, Hr),
(Hl, R
k, T ), or (Hl, T
k, R) for k ≥ 1, P2 = (T,Rk, T )
or (R, T k, R) for k ≥ 2, and P3 = (T,R) or (R, T ).
We say a suborder Si is a local suborder if it has a
local pattern, and it is associated with a local zone, de-
noted by ZSi , which is the line segment between the
two end nodes of that local suborder. For example, if
Si = (T1, R1, · · · , Rk, Hr), then ZSi = T1Hr. The vul-
nerability of a local zone ZSi is Q(ZSi). We denote the
length of ZSi by LSi.
We observe that for any local suborder Si with any
spacings, the closest transmitter and receiver from S
for any local vulnerable point in ZSi are nodes from Si.
For example, if Si = (T1, R1), we can see that the clos-
est transmitter and receiver for YT1R1 are T1 and R1,
respectively; if Si = (T1, R1, · · · , Rk, Hr), the closest
transmitter for any of YT1R1 , · · · , YRk−1Rk , Hr, is T1,
and the closest receiver for any of YT1R1 , · · · , YRk−1Rk ,
Hr, is from {R1, · · · , Rk}. Hence, the vulnerability of
a local zone ZSi , i.e., Q(ZSi), only depends on the lo-
cations of nodes in Si, or in other words, depends on
the spacings DSi , and it is independent of the locations
of nodes not in Si. Similar observations can be made
for any local suborder. Using Lemma (1), in the next
result, we characterize the balanced spacings of a local
suborder.
Lemma 2. For any c > 0, let e0(c) , 2
√
c and ej(c)
be the unique positive value of x such that (
∑j−1
i=0 ei(c)+
x/2)(x/2) = c for any j ≥ 1. Given any c > 0 and any
local suborder Si, there exist unique spacings DSi such
that DSi is balanced with Q(ZSi) = c. Furthermore, it
is given by, e.g., if Si = (T1, R1), then DSi = (e0);
if Si = (T1, R1, · · · , Rk, Hr), then
DSi = (e0, e1, · · · , ek−1, ek/2);
if Si = (T1, R1, · · · , Rk, T2) and k is even, then
DSi = (e0, e1, · · · , ek/2−1, ek/2, ek/2−1, · · · , e1, e0)
or if k is odd, then
DSi = (e0, e1, · · · , e(k−1)/2, e(k−1)/2, · · · , e1, e0)
where the arguments“(c)”of ei(c) are omitted for brevity.
Similar results can be obtained for any other local sub-
order.
By definition, given c, the value of ei(c), i ≥ 0 can
be found iteratively and it decreases as i increases (see
Table 1).
The following lemma shows that balanced spacings
are optimal for a local suborder.
Lemma 3. Given any local suborder Si, suppose DSi
is balanced with Q(ZSi) = c. If S
′
i is the same local sub-
order as Si and with spacings DS′
i
such that Q(ZS′
i
) ≤ c,
then LS′
i
≤ LSi . Furthermore, if LS′i = LSi , then
DS′
i
= DSi .
Table 1: Values of balanced spacings
c e0(c) e1(c) e2(c) e3(c) e4(c)
1 2.0000 0.8284 0.6357 0.5359 0.4721
5 4.4721 1.8524 1.4214 1.1983 1.0557
10 6.3246 2.6197 2.0102 1.6947 1.4930
20 8.9443 3.7048 2.8428 2.3966 2.1115
Lemma 3 suggests that given a local suborder and a
constraint on the local zone’s vulnerability, the balanced
spacings maximize the length of the local zone.
We need the following lemma which reduces our search
space significantly.
Lemma 4. There exists an optimal order S not hav-
ing a suborder with any of the following patterns: (T, T ,
R,R), (R,R, T, T ), (T, T,R,Hr), (R,R, T,Hr), (Hl, T ,
R,R), and (Hl, R, T, T, ).
We say an order S is a candidate order if it does not have
a suborder with any of the patterns given in Lemma 4.
We observe that any given candidate order S consists
of a series of local suborders S1, · · · ,Sm such that 1)
each node in S is included in some Si; 2) the last node
of Si is the first node of Si+1 for all i = 1, · · · ,m − 1.
In particular, S1 and Sm have patterns P1, and Si has
pattern P2 or P3 for i = 2, · · · ,m− 1. For example,
S = (
S1︷ ︸︸ ︷
Hl, R1, R2, ︸ ︷︷ ︸
S2
T1, R3, R4, R5,
S3︷ ︸︸ ︷
T2, R6, T3, T4, Hr︸ ︷︷ ︸
S4
).
Accordingly,HlHr consists of a series of local zones ZS1 ,
· · · , ZSm , and DS consists of a series of spacings DS1 ,
· · · , DSm . To see why such a series of local suborders
exists for any given candidate order S, we construct a
super order S+ from S by combining neighbor nodes
of the same type in S into a super node. A node not
combined in S is a simple node in S+. For the above
example, the super order is given by
S+ = (Hl, R
+
1,2, T1, R
+
3,4,5, T2, R6, T
+
3,4, Hr).
It is clear by our construction that two neighbor nodes
in S+ (excluding Hl and Hr) are of different types
(transmitter type or receiver type). Since S is a candi-
date order, it does not have a suborder with any pattern
given in Lemma 4. Hence, it can be easily checked that
two neighbor nodes in S+ can not be both super nodes,
and a super node can not be the third or third-to-last
node in S+. Then we can see that the first three nodes
and the last three nodes in S+ represent two local sub-
orders with patterns P1; each super node and its two
neighbor simple nodes in S+ represent a local suborder
with pattern P2; two neighbor simple nodes not at the
beginning or end of S+ (excluding Hl andHr) represent
a local suborder with pattern P3.
The decoupled structure of a candidate order allows
us to apply results of local suborders. Consider a given
candidate order S. We know that S consists of a se-
ries of local suborders S1, · · · ,Sm. As a result, the set
of local vulnerability values on HlHr is a union of dis-
joint sets of local vulnerability values on all the local
zones ZS1 , · · · , ZSm . Therefore, since local vulnerabil-
ity values on a local zone ZSi only depend on the corre-
sponding spacings DSi , we can see that DS is balanced
with Q(HlHr) = c if and only if DSi is balanced with
Q(ZSi) = c for all i = 1, · · · ,m. Hence, by Lemma 2,
there exists unique DS such that DS is balanced with
Q(HlHr) = c.
We observe that given a candidate order S, under the
constraint that DS is balanced with Q(HlHr) = c, DS
varies as a function of c. It follows from Lemma 2 that
each of ‖HlS1‖, · · · , ‖SJHr‖ is an increasing function
of c, and hence ‖HlHr‖ = ‖HlS1‖ + · · · + ‖SJHr‖ is
also an increasing function of c. Furthermore, it can
be easily verified that ‖HlHr‖ = 0 when c = 0 and
‖HlHr‖ → ∞ when c→∞. Thus, there exists a unique
c > 0 such that ‖HlHr‖ = h. This implies that under
the constraint ‖HlHr‖ = h, there exist unique balanced
DS. We summary this result below as a corollary of
Lemma 2.
Corollary 1. Given any candidate order S, under
the constraint ‖HlHr‖ = h, there exist unique spacings
DS such that DS is balanced.
Applying Lemma 3, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Given any candidate order S, the unique
balanced spacings DS minimize Q(HlHr) under the con-
straint ‖HlHr‖ = h.
Theorem 3 suggests that the optimal spacings for any
given candidate order is the unique balanced spacings
referred in Corollary 1.
Since we have found the optimal spacings D∗
S
for any
candidate order S, our next step is to find an opti-
mal order S∗. Suppose the number of transmitters is
no greater than the number of receivers, i.e., M ≤ N ,
WLOG. Since all transmitters are equivalent, we sup-
pose that transmitters in S are indexed by their order
in S such that 0 ≤ ‖HlT1‖ ≤ · · · ≤ ‖HlTM‖ ≤ ‖HlHr‖.
Define N , (nHlT1 , nT1T2 , · · · , nTM−1TM , nTMHr ) where
nTiTi+1 , nHlT1 , and nTMHr denote the number of re-
ceivers between Ti and Ti+1, between Hl and T1, and
between TM and Hr, respectively, in S. Since all re-
ceivers are equivalent, it suffices to determine nTiTi+1 ,
nHlT1 , and nTMHr for an optimal order. The next re-
sult provides sufficient conditions for the optimality of
an order.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Hl
Hl
Hr
Hr
Hr
Hl
Figure 4: Optimal deployment locations of radar
transmitters (square) and receivers (circle) for
(a) M = 3 and N = 7 (b) M = 3 and N = 8 (c)
M = 3 and N = 9.
Theorem 4. A candidate order S is optimal if
|nTiTi+1 − nTjTj+1 | ≤ 1, ∀i 6= j
|nTiTi+1 − 2nHlT1 | ≤ 1, |nTiTi+1 − 2nTMHr | ≤ 1, ∀i.
Using the optimality conditions in Theorem 4, we can
find an optimal order S∗ described as follows. Let two
integers q and r be the quotient and remainder of N/M .
If q is even, there exists an S∗ such that
N∗ = (
q
2
,
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
q + 1, · · · , q + 1,
M−1−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
q, · · · , q, q
2
);
if q is odd and r = 0, there exists an S∗ such that
N∗ = (
q + 1
2
,
M−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
q, · · · , q, q − 1
2
);
if q is odd and r ≥ 1, there exists an S∗ such that
N∗ = (
q + 1
2
,
r−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
q + 1, · · · , q + 1,
M−r︷ ︸︸ ︷
q, · · · , q, q + 1
2
).
It can be easily seen that any order obtained from the
above optimal order by exchanging the values of nHlT1
and nTMHr , or the values of nTiTi+1 and nTjTj+1 for
some i 6= j, also satisfies the optimality condition, and
hence is optimal. We observe that the optimal order
also exhibits a balanced structure.
Given an optimal order S∗, by Theorem 3, the opti-
mal spacingsD∗
S∗
is the unique balanced spacings under
the constraint ‖HlHr‖ = h. The optimal spacings can
be found by a bisection search. In each search step,
for a search criterion c, we can obtain by Lemma 2 the
unique balanced spacings DS∗ with Q(HlHr) = c, and
hence obtain ‖HlHr‖. If ‖HlHr‖ > h, c is decreased
for the next step; if ‖HlHr‖ < h, c is increased for the
next step. The search completes if ‖HlHr‖ = h. Upon
completion, the optimal spacings D∗
S∗
is found and the
optimal value of Q(HlHr) is equal to the search crite-
rion c.
4. RANDOM DEPLOYMENT
Next, we consider random deployment that can also
be of great interest. In this scenario, given arbitrary lo-
cations of radars resulted from random deployment, we
aim to find the worst-case intrusion path P ∗ and the
worst-case intrusion detectability B(P ∗). Due to the
complex geometry of bistatic radar SNR, it is difficult
to find P ∗ accurately. Therefore, we design an efficient
algorithm for finding an intrusion path P ′ whose de-
tectability is arbitrarily close to B(P ∗). Our algorithm
partitions the field F into sub-regions based on a novel
2-site Voronoi diagram, and then constructs a weighted
graph G for the sub-regions to search for an approxi-
mate worst-case intrusion path P ′G.
Given a set of points S, the Voronoi region VS(s) of
a point s ∈ S is the set of points which are closer to s
than to any other point in S, i.e.,
VS(s) , {p|min
s′∈S
‖ps′‖ = ‖ps‖}. (7)
The Voronoi diagram for S is the collection of all Voronoi
regions {VS(s), s ∈ S}. To partition the field F , we
first construct Voronoi diagrams for the set of trans-
mitters T and the set of receivers R, respectively, i.e.,
{VT (Ti), Ti ∈ T } and {VR(Rj), Rj ∈ R}, within the
boundaries of F . Then F can be partitioned into 2-
site Voronoi regions, where a 2-site Voronoi region, de-
noted by VT ,R(Ti, Rj), is the intersection of a transmit-
ter Voronoi region and a receiver Voronoi region, i.e.,
VT ,R(Ti, Rj) , VT (Ti) ∩ VR(Rj) (8)
for all Ti ∈ T and Rj ∈ R such that VT (Ti)∩VR(Rj) 6=
∅ (see Figure 5). Choose an arbitrary ǫ > 0. For each
2-site Voronoi region VT ,R(Ti, Rj), we plot a sequence
of Cassini ovals CTi,Rj (kǫ) for consecutive positive in-
teger values of k such that VT ,R(Ti, Rj) is further di-
vided by these Cassini ovals into sub-regions where each
sub-region is bounded between two Cassini ovals with
distance products being consecutive multiples of ǫ.
We construct a graph G = (V,E) where each vertex
represents a sub-region, and two vertices are connected
by an edge if they are adjacent sub-regions. Then we
assign each vertex vi a weight wi, which is equal to
the smaller distance product of the two Cassini ovals
bounding this sub-region. We add two virtual vertices
s and t to represent the entrance and destination of F ,
respectively. There exists an edge between vertex s and
vi for vi ∈ V \ {s, t} if sub-region vi is adjacent to the
entrance. Similarly, we add an edge between vertex t
and vi for vi ∈ V \ {s, t} if sub-region vi is adjacent to
the destination.
It is clear that any intrusion path P is represented by
an s−t path in G, denoted by PG. We define the weight
of an s − t path PG, denoted by W (PG), as W (PG) ,
min{i:vi∈PG} wi. We aim to find an s− t path P ′G with
maximum weight. This can be obtained by a bisection
cT1
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v2
v3
v5
v1
b
a
d
e
Figure 5: Overlapping Voronoi diagrams for
radar transmitters and receivers. The polygon
with indices {a, b, c, d, e} is a 2-site Voronoi region
with respect to T1 and R1; it is divided into sub-
regions {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}.
search between the smallest and largest vertex weights
in G. In each step, breadth-first-search is used to check
the existence of a s − t path using only vertices with
weights larger than a search criterion c. If a path exists,
c is increased to restrict the vertices considered in the
next search step; otherwise, c is decreased to relax the
constraint on the search. Upon completion, a s− t path
with maximum weight is found.
Suppose M = O(n) and N = O(n). The number of
vertices in graph G, i.e., the number of sub-regions in
field F , is O(n8/ǫ2+n6/ǫ+n4) and the reason is as fol-
lows. We can treat the field F as a planar graph, where
the vertices are the crossing points of Voronoi edges and
Cassini ovals, and the edges are line segments or curves
between two crossing points. The number of Voronoi
edges and the number of Voronoi vertices are bothO(n).
So the number of crossing points of Voronoi edges is
O(n2). Hence, the number of 2-site Voronoi vertices is
O(n2), and the number of 2-site Voronoi edges is O(n4).
Since the field F is bounded, the number of Cassini
ovals plotted for a 2-site Voronoi region is O(1/ǫ). So
the total number of crossing points of Cassini ovals with
2-site Voronoi edges is O(n4/ǫ). Hence, the number of
vertices of sub-regions is O(n4/ǫ+n2), and the number
of edges of sub-regions is O(n8/ǫ2+n6/ǫ+n4). By Eu-
ler’s formula, the number of faces, which is the number
of sub-regions, is 2 -O(n4/ǫ+n2) +O(n8/ǫ2+n6/ǫ+n4),
equal to O(n8/ǫ2 + n6/ǫ+ n4).
In the next result, part (a) follows from the definition
of 2-site Voronoi diagram and our graph construction;
part (b) follows from our result on the number of ver-
tices in graph G. The proof is omitted due to space
limitation.
Theorem 5. (a) The maximum path weight obtained
by our proposed approximation algorithm is within ǫ to
Hl
Hl
Hr
Hr
(a)
(b)
Figure 6: Heuristic deployment locations of
radar transmitters (square) and receivers (cir-
cle) for M = 3 and N = 8 (a) HEU-1 (b) HEU-2.
the worst-case detectability, i.e.,
B(P ∗)− ǫ ≤W (P ′G) ≤ B(P ∗). (9)
(b) Given ǫ, our proposed approximation algorithm has
polynomial-time complexity.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present some numerical results to
illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed optimal radar
deployment scheme.
We examine the vulnerability of a line segment H un-
der the line-based deployment. In particular, we com-
pare the optimal deployment scheme (OPT) with two
heuristic deployment schemes. The first heuristic (HEU-
1) is to deploy radar transmitters (or receivers, respec-
tively) with uniform spacings such that the maximum
distance from a point on H to its closet transmitter
(or receiver, respectively) is minimized (see Figure 6).
Specifically, HEU-1 results in 2‖HlT1‖ = ‖T1T2‖
= · · · = ‖TM−1TM‖ = 2‖TMHr‖ and 2‖HlR1‖ =
‖R1R2‖ = · · · = ‖RN−1RN‖ = 2‖RNHr‖, where trans-
mitters and receivers are indexed by their orders in S,
respectively. It can be easily verified that this scheme is
optimal if we treat radar transmitters (or receivers, re-
spectively) as traditional sensors with disk-based sens-
ing model. The second heuristic (HEU-2) is to deploy
radar transmitters and receivers according to an op-
timal order S∗ from OPT but with uniform spacings
such that the maximum distance from a point on H
to its closet transmitter or receiver is minimized (see
Figure 6). Specifically, HEU-2 results in 2‖HlS∗1‖ =
‖S∗1S∗2‖ = · · · = ‖S∗M−1S∗M‖ = 2‖S∗MHr‖.
Figure 7, Figure 8 and Figure 9 depict the vulnera-
bility of H versus the number of radar receivers for 3,
5, and 10 radar transmitters, respectively, where we set
h = 100. We note that HEU-2 results in considerably
lower vulnerability than HEU-1. This is because HEU-1
deploys transmitters and receivers independently, while
HEU-2 takes into account the joint design of transmit-
ters and receivers. We observe that OPT further out-
performs HEU-2 significantly. This suggests that opti-
mal spacings is critical for improving the performance
due to the complex geometry of bistatic radar SNR.
Next, we evaluate the worst-case intrusion detectabil-
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Figure 7: Vulnerability vs. number of radar re-
ceivers for 3 radar transmitters.
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Figure 8: Vulnerability vs. number of radar re-
ceivers for 5 radar transmitters.
ity under random deployment using our proposed ap-
proximate algorithm. We consider a square field F of
size 100 × 100, where two opposite sides are entrance
and destination, respectively, and the other two op-
posite sides are left and right boundaries, respectively.
We consider deploying transmitters and receivers in the
field randomly (RAN) with uniform distribution.
Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12 depict the worst-
case intrusion detectability versus the number of radar
receivers for 3, 5, and 10 radar transmitters, respec-
tively, where we also plot the shortcut barrier-based op-
timal deployment scheme (OPT). The results for RAN
are averaged over 100 simulation runs. We observe that
OPT performs significantly better than RAN. The rea-
son is that deployment on a barrier is essentially much
more efficient than deployment in the full field for worst-
case coverage.
6. RELATED WORK
Worst-case coverage has been first studied in [5] for a
traditional sensor network. Polynomial-time algorithms
are devised to find maximum breach and maximum
support paths between two locations. An efficient al-
gorithm is proposed in [7] to solve the best-coverage
problem raised in [5]. In [6], efficient algorithms are de-
veloped to find the minimum exposure path in sensor
networks. Localized algorithms are designed in [11] to
solve the minimum exposure path problem. A new cov-
erage measure that captures both the best and worst-
case coverage is studied in [9]. The deployment prob-
lem to improve the maximal breach path is considered
by [8, 12].
Barrier coverage is an intimately related problem to
worst-case coverage. The concept of weak and strong
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Figure 9: Vulnerability vs. number of radar re-
ceivers for 10 radar transmitters.
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Figure 10: Worst-case detectability vs. number
of radar receivers for 3 radar transmitters.
barrier coverage has been introduced in [13], where crit-
ical condition of weak barrier coverage is obtained for
random deployment. The critical condition of strong
barrier coverage is derived in [14] using percolation the-
ory. An effective metric of barrier coverage quality is
proposed in [15]. [16] studies constructing barrier by
sensors with limited mobility after initial deployment.
A novel full-view coverage model is proposed in [17] for
constructing barrier in camera sensor networks.
7. CONCLUSION
Radar technology has great potential in many ap-
plications, such as border monitoring, security surveil-
lance. In this paper, we studied the worst-case coverage
for a bistatic radar network consisting of multiple radar
transmitters and radar receivers, where each pair of
radar transmitter and receiver can form a bistatic radar.
The problem of optimal radar deployment is highly non-
trivial since 1) the detection range of a bistatic radar
is characterized by Cassini oval which presents complex
geometry; 2) the detection ranges of different bistatic
radars are coupled and the network coverage is inti-
mately related to the locations of all radar nodes. We
present a general assumption on the field geometry un-
der which it is optimal to deploy radars on a shortest
line segment across the field, for maximizing the worst-
case intrusion detectability. Further, we characterized
the corresponding optimal deployment locations along
this shortest line segment. Specifically, the optimal de-
ployment locations exhibits a balanced structure. We
also developed a polynomial-time approximation algo-
rithm for characterizing the worst-case intrusion path
for any given deployment of radars.
To the best of our knowledge, the optimality of line-
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Figure 11: Worst-case detectability vs. number
of radar receivers for 5 radar transmitters.
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Figure 12: Worst-case detectability vs. number
of radar receivers for 10 radar transmitters.
based deployment for the worst-case coverage, in par-
ticular for bistatic radar networks, has not been studied
before this work. Although the detectability model in-
volves some idealized assumptions, we believe that this
work will be of value in setting the foundations for net-
worked radar systems. There are still many questions
remaining open for the design of networked radar.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Consider any given deployment locations {T ,R}.
It suffices to show that there exist deployment locations
{T ′,R′} on H such that B(P ∗) ≥ B′(P ∗′), where ′ in-
dicates that the deployment locations are {T ′,R′}. It
follows from Property 1 that there exists a curve barrier
U with U ⊂ A(B(P ∗)). Let Ul and Ur be the end points
of curve U with Ul ∈ Fl and Ur ∈ Fr. We will show
that the deployment at {T ′,R′} forms a line barrier
UlUr with Q
′(UlUr) ≤ Q(U) (see Figure 13).
Let U ′ be the line passing through Ul and Ur. Then
we can find the projection of any Ti ∈ T and Rj ∈ R
onto line U ′, denoted by T ′i and R
′
j , such that TiT
′
i ⊥ U ′
and RjR′j ⊥ U ′. Consider any p′ ∈ UlUr. Since curve U
is a path from Ul to Ur, we can find a p ∈ U such that
p′ is the projection of p onto line U ′. Then it follows
from the property of projection that ‖Tip‖ ≥ ‖T ′ip′‖ and
‖Rjp‖ ≥ ‖R′jp′‖ for all i, j. Hence, from (2) we have
I(p) ≤ I ′(p′), and it follows that Q′(UlUr) ≤ Q(U)
due to (5). Since H is the shortcut barrier, we have
h ≤ ‖UlUr‖. Thus, we can translate the line-based de-
Ul
Ur
Ti
Rj
T ′i R
′
jp
′
p
U ′
U
Figure 13: An arbitrary radar deployment forms
a curve barrier U (solid curve), while a line-
based radar deployment can form a line barrier
UlUr (dashed line) with no greater vulnerability.
ployment {T ′,R′} onto the line where H lies such that
Q′(H) ≤ Q(U). Note that {T ′,R′} may not be all on
H . In this case, we can move each T ′i /∈ H or R′j /∈ H to
its closest end point ofH such that I ′(p) is not increased
for all p ∈ H and hence Q′(H) ≤ Q(U) still holds.
Therefore, since H is a barrier and U ⊂ A(B(P ∗)), we
have B′(P ∗′) ≤ Q′(H) ≤ Q(U) ≤ B(P ∗). 
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Consider any given deployment locations {T ,R}
on H . From the definition of barrier we have B(P ∗) ≤
Q(H). Suppose B(P ∗) < Q(H). The proof is based
on contradiction. It follows from Property 1 that there
exists a barrier U with U ⊂ A(B(P ∗)) ⊂ A(Q(H)).
We will show that barrier U must intersect with H (see
Figure 14).
Step 1: Consider a point p ∈ H with I(p) = Q(H).
Suppose p 6= Hl and p 6= Hr. Let H ′ be the line passing
through p such thatH ′ ⊥ H . Consider any p′ ∈ H ′ with
p′ 6= p. Since ‖Tip′‖ > ‖Tip‖ and ‖Rjp′‖ > ‖Rjp‖ for
all i, j, we have I(p′) > I(p) and hence p′ /∈ A(Q(H)).
Thus H ′ intersects with A(Q(H)) at a unique point p.
Step 2: Let Al(Q(H)) and Ar(Q(H)) denote the sub-
sets of A(Q(H)) on the left and right side of H ′, respec-
tively (see Figure 14). Define Oc(r) as an open disk
centered at point c with radius r. We will show that
Al(Q(H)) ⊂ OHl(h) and Ar(Q(H)) ⊂ OHr (h).
Let OHl(h) denote the circle centered at Hl with ra-
dius h. Then let O
l
Hl(h) denote the subset of OHl(h)
on the left side of H ′, which is an arc. It can be verified
that ‖Tia‖ > ‖Tip‖ and ‖Rja‖ > ‖Rjp‖ for all i, j and
for all a ∈ OlHl(h). Then since I(p) = Q(H), we have
A(Q(H))∩OlHl(h) = ∅. This implies that Al(Q(H)) ⊂
OHl(h). Similarly, we can show Ar(Q(H)) ⊂ OHr (h).
Step 3: Let Ul and Ur be the end points of U with
Ul ∈ Fl and Ur ∈ Fr. Then we have Ul /∈ OHr (h) and
Ur /∈ OHl(h), since otherwise ‖UlHr‖ < h or ‖HlUr‖ <
h, which contradicts that H is the shortcut barrier. Us-
ing the result of Step 2, we have Ul ∈ Al(Q(H)) and
Ur ∈ Ar(Q(H)). Thus, curve U must intersect H ′.
From the result of Step 1, U must pass through p. This
implies that Q(U) ≥ I(p) = Q(H), which contradicts
Hl
p
H ′
Hr
Al(Q(H)) Ar(Q(H))
O
l
Hl
(h)
Ti Rj
p′
Figure 14: Any barrier with possibly lower vul-
nerability than the shortcut barrier H must lie
in the detection range A(Q(H)) (grey area) and
pass through a line H ′ which has a unique inter-
section p with A(Q(H)).
that Q(U) ≤ B(P ∗) < Q(H). 
C. PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We start with an observations which is used repeatedly
in this proof. Clearly, for any p ∈ H , I(p) only de-
pends on the distances of p to its closest transmitter
and receiver, say Ti and Rj , respectively. If p /∈ TiRj ,
I(p) = ‖Tip‖‖Rjp‖ decreases as p moves towards Ti and
Rj ; if p ∈ TiRj , since ‖Tip‖+ ‖pRj‖ = ‖TiRj‖ is a con-
stant, it can be easily verified that I(p) = ‖Tip‖‖pRj‖
increases as p moves towards YTiRj , and hence attains
maximum when p = YTiRj .
The main idea of this proof is to divide the line seg-
ment between each pair of neighbor nodes into intervals
such that all points on an interval have the same pair of
closest transmitter and receiver, and then we examine
the structure of detectability on each interval using the
observation presented above. Due to space limitation,
we only prove the case when Sk and Sk+1 have different
types (transmitter type and receiver type) for some k.
The same idea is used to prove other cases.
Suppose Sk and Sk+1 have different types. Without
loss of generality (WLOG), let Sk = Ti and Sk+1 = Rj .
1) Suppose the closest transmitter and receiver are Ti
and Rj for any p ∈ TiRj . Since I(p) = ‖Tip‖‖pRj‖
for p ∈ TiRj , I(p) increases as p moves towards YTiRj .
2) Suppose there exists some Rm ∈ HlTi such that
YRmRj ∈ TiYTiRj . Then I(p) = ‖Rmp‖‖Tip‖ for p ∈
TiYRmRj , and I(p) = ‖Tip‖‖pRj‖ for p ∈ YRmRjYTiRj .
For each case of p, I(p) increases as p moves towards
YTiRj . Similarly, if there exists some Tn ∈ RjHr such
that YTiTn ∈ YTiRjRj , we can also show that I(p) in-
creases as p moves towards YTiRj for p ∈ YTiRjRj .
D. PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Due to space limitation, we only prove the case of Si
with pattern P1, and the same idea is used to prove
other cases. The main idea is to determine the spacing
between two neighbor nodes successively according to
the given order of nodes.
Suppose Si = (T1, R1, · · · , Rk, Hr) and DSi is bal-
anced with Q(T1Hr) = c. It follows from I(YT1R1) =
(‖T1R1‖/2)2 = c that ‖T1R1‖ = 2√c. Since I(YR1R2) =
‖T1YR1R2‖ ‖YR1R2R2‖ = (‖T1R1‖+ ‖R1R2‖/2)
(‖R1R2‖/2) = c, given ‖T1R1‖ = 2√c, we obtain a
unique value of ‖R1R2‖. Similarly, in a recursive man-
ner, given the values of ‖T1R1‖, · · · , ‖Ri−1Ri‖, we ob-
tain a unique value of ‖RiRi+1‖ such that I(YRiRi+1) =
c . . . until we obtain a unique value of ‖RkHr‖ such
that I(Hr) = c. Then we can see that ‖T1R1‖ = e0(c),
‖R1R2‖ = e1(c), · · · , ‖Rk−1Rk‖ = ek−1(c), ‖RkHr‖ =
ek(c)/2. Similar results can be shown for any Si with
pattern P1.
E. PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Due to space limitation, we only prove the case of Si
with pattern P1 and the same idea is used to prove
other cases. Suppose Si = (T1, R1, · · · , Rk, Hr) and
S′i = (T
′
1, R
′
1, · · · , R′k, H ′r). Let I ′(p) denote the de-
tectability of p under S′i. The proof is based on contra-
diction. Suppose ‖T ′1H ′r‖ > ‖T1Hr‖. Since I(YT1R1) =
(‖T1R1‖/2)2 = c ≥ I ′(YT ′
1
R′
1
) = (‖T ′1R′1‖/2)2, we have
‖T ′1R′1‖ ≤ ‖T1R1‖. Using this, we can show ‖T ′1R′2‖
≤ ‖T1R2‖. Then following a similar argument, using
‖T ′1R′2‖ ≤ ‖T1R2‖, we can show ‖T ′1R′3‖ ≤ ‖T1R3‖ . . .
until ‖T ′1R′k‖ ≤ ‖T1Rk‖.
Since we have supposed ‖T ′1H ′r‖ > ‖T1Hr‖, we must
have ‖R′kH ′r‖ = ‖T ′1H ′r‖−‖T ′1R′k‖ > ‖T1Hr‖−‖T1Rk‖ =
‖RkHr‖. It follows that I ′(H ′r) = ‖T ′1H ′r‖‖R′kH ′r‖ >
‖T1Hr‖‖RkHr‖ = c, which is a contradiction. Thus we
conclude ‖T ′1H ′r‖ ≤ ‖T1Hr‖. Further, it can be easily
verified that if ‖T ′1H ′r‖ = ‖T1Hr‖, we have ‖T ′1R′1‖ =
‖T1R1‖, · · · , ‖R′kH ′r‖ = ‖RkHr‖. Similar results can
be shown for any Si with pattern P1.
F. PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Suppose S = (Hl, · · · , T1, T2, R1, R2, · · · , Hr) with any
spacings. We can construct a new order of locations
S′ = (H ′l , · · · , T ′1, R′1, T ′2, R′2, · · · , H ′r) from S by swap-
ping the locations of nodes T2 and R1. Let I
′(p) denote
the detectability of p after the swapping. We observe
that for any local vulnerable point p ∈ HlT1, the clos-
est transmitter is not T2, and for any local vulnera-
ble point p ∈ R2Hr, ‖T2p‖ ≥ ‖T ′2p‖. Similar obser-
vations can be made for R1 and R
′
1. Thus we can
see that I ′(p) ≤ I(p) for any local vulnerable point
p ∈ HlT1 or p ∈ R2Hr. We also observe that I(YT1T2) ≥
(‖T1T2‖/2)2 = (‖T ′1R′1‖/2)2 = I ′(YT ′1R′1). Similarly,
we can obtain I(YR1R2) ≥ I ′(YT ′2R′2). Furthermore,
we have I(YT2R1) = (‖T2R1‖/2)2 = (‖R′1T ′2‖/2)2 =
I ′(YR′
1
T ′
2
). Thus we have shown that I ′(p) ≤ I(p) for
any local vulnerable point p ∈ HlHr, and hence,
Q(HlHr) is not increased after the swapping. Simi-
lar results can be shown for an order with any pattern
given in the claim by a swapping argument.
G. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Suppose DS is balanced with Q(HlHr) = c. We have
shown that S consists of a series of local suborders
S1, · · · ,Sm. Suppose S′ is the same order as S and with
spacings DS′ such that Q
′(H ′lH
′
r) ≤ c, where Q′(H ′lH ′r)
denote the vulnerability of H ′lH
′
r under S
′. Then S′
also consists of a series of local suborders S′1, · · · ,S′m
such that Sj and S
′
j are the same local suborders for
all j = 1, · · · ,m. It is clear that Q′(ZS′
j
) ≤ c, ∀j.
Then Lemma 3 implies that LS′
i
≤ LSj , ∀j. Since∑m
j=1 LSj = h =
∑m
j=1 LS′j , we must have LS′j = LSj ,∀j. Hence, by Lemma 3, we have DS′ = DS.
H. PROOF SKETCH OF THEOREM 4
Consider any given candidate order S. Clearly, S con-
sists of suborders S1, · · · , SM+1 where S1 = (Hl, · · · , T1),
· · · , Si = (Ti−1, · · · , Ti), · · · , SM+1 = (TM , · · · , Hr).
SupposeDS is balanced with ‖HlHr‖ = h andQ(HlHr)
= c.
The proof has two steps. In step 1, we suppose the
conditions given in the claim do not hold, and then we
can find a new order S′ from S with some spacings DS′
such that Q′(H ′lH
′
r) ≤ c and ‖H ′lH ′r‖ ≥ ‖HlHr‖, where
Q′(H ′lH
′
r) denote the vulnerability of H
′
lH
′
r under S
′.
This implies that S′ is no worse than S. Repeating
this argument, we can eventually find a new order S′
satisfying the conditions in the claim and is no worse
than S. In step 2, we show that all candidate orders
satisfying the conditions in the claim are equivalently
good. This implies that they are all optimal orders.
Due to space limitation, we only prove step 1 for the
case nTi−1Ti ≥ nTj−1Tj + 2 and nTj−1Tj ≥ 2. The same
idea is used to prove other cases in step 1 although more
intricate arguments are needed for some cases.
Suppose nTi−1Ti ≥ nTj−1Tj + 2 and nTj−1Tj ≥ 2.
Clearly, Si and Sj must be local suborders. We can
construct a new order S′ from S by moving a receiver
from between Ti−1 and Ti in Si to between Tj−1 and Tj
in Sj . Then we set the spacings DS′
i
and DS′
j
balanced
and Q(ZS′
i
) = Q(ZS′
j
) = c, and we keep the spacings of
any other suborder unchanged, i.e., DSm = DS′m for all
m 6= i, j. Therefore, we must have Q′(H ′lH ′r) = c.
We observe from Lemma 2 that we have LS′
j
−LSj =
e(nTj−1Tj+1)/2(c) if nTj−1Tj is odd or enTj−1Tj /2(c) if
nTj−1Tj is even. Also, we have LSi−LS′i = e(nTi−1Ti−1)/2(c)
if nTi−1Ti is odd or enTi−1Ti/2(c) if nTi−1Ti is even. Since
e0(c) > e1(c) > e2(c) > · · · for any c, in any case, we
have ‖H ′lH ′r‖−‖HlHr‖ = (LS′j−LSj)−(LSi−LS′i) > 0.
Recall that we have shown Q′(H ′lH
′
r) = c. Then the de-
sired result follows.
